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Driggers: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MINISTER'S PENSION CONTRACT IS AN
"ECCLESIASTICAL MATTER"
NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT

In Pearson v. Church of God' the South Carolina Court of Appeals faced
a church-related contract dispute and held that the courts have no authority to
construe secular terms appearing in a church's governing document. 2
Specifically, the case called for an interpretation of the terms "license" and
"ministry" as they appeared in the Minutes of the 62nd General Assembly of
the Church of God (Minutes).' The majority refused to look at the meaning
of these terms because the dispute was essentially an "ecclesiastical matter" 4
and, therefore, outside the constitutional authority of judicial process.' Judge
Connor, however, did not fully agree with the majority's disavowal of
constitutional authority. That is, Judge Connor concurred with the majority
result but argued for denial of the pension benefits based on "neutral principles
of contract law," not deference to ecclesiastical sovereignty.6
Frank C. Pearson, a retired minister with the Church of God (Church),
collected benefits under the Church's Aged Ministers' Pensioning Plan
(Plan). 7 Pearson's payments ceased when he confessed to a charge of
adultery' before the Church's State Trial Board.9 Upon finding a minister
guilty of adultery, the Church's governing provisions require the revocation
of the minister's "license." 0 In turn, this revocation prompted the Church
to terminate Pearson's pension payments. The Plan stated that "[a]ny aged

1. __ S.C. __, 458 S.E.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1995).
2. Id. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 72.
3. Id. at
, 458 S.E.2d at 70.
4. Such a matter is defined as "[o]ne that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of
the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 512 (6th ed.
1990).
5. Pearson, _ S.C. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 72.
6. Id. at __,458 S.E.2d at 73 (Connor, J., concurring).
7. Id. at __,458 S.E.2d at 69.
8. Id. at __,458 S.E.2d at 70. Pearson's act violated the Church's policy against sexual
misconduct. See id. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Minutes, S60 DisorderlyMinisters).
9. The Board consists of at least three ordained ministers appointed by the Church through
the State Overseer. Id. at _,
458 S.E.2d at 70.
10. See Minutes, S60 DisorderlyMinisters ("The license of a minister must be revoked when
found guilty of adultery or fornication." (emphasis added)), quoted in Pearson,_ S.C. at _,
458 S.E.2d at 69.
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minister receiving benefit from the Aged Ministers' Fund whose ministry has
been revoked shall cease to draw compensation from the fund.""
At trial, the central dispute was over the terms "license" and "ministry"
as these words were used in the Plan and as contained in the Minutes.'
Pearson argued that the Plan was a legal contract. 3 He further argued that
the use of the terms "license" and "ministry" in the two provisions of the
Minutes was ambiguous and created a jury question to be examined under
traditional contract principles.' 4 In its defense, the Church asserted that the
meaning of the two terms involved an ecclesiastical matter that only Church
authority could
resolve." The trial judge entered judgment on a jury verdict
6
for Pearson.1
On appeal the Church argued the jury verdict should be reversed because
the judicial courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of
appeals agreed and reversed the jury's verdict.' 7 The court based its decision
on a detailed analysis of both South Carolina constitutional and First
Amendment jurisprudence." Primarily, however, the majority followed the
general rule recognized by the United States Supreme Court in SerbianEastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.'9 The court held that because the dispute
involved an ecclesiastical matter the courts lacked jurisdiction under the
church-state separation principles of both the United States and South Carolina
Constitutions.' Under this holding, the terms "license" and "ministry," in
the context of the Plan and the Minutes, constituted a religious controversy and
should be defined in terms of the Church's authority. 2'
The court's refusal to accept jurisdiction of a church dispute involving an
ecclesiastical matter is consistent with the constitutional standard recognized
in both federal and South Carolina law. The federal standard is found in

11. Pearson,_

S.C. at,

458 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Minutes, S62 Retirement Plans,cl.

I.A.19).
12. The trial judge noted: "That is what this case is about, what does revocation of a license
mean, and if that is revocation, what does ministry mean." Record at 170.
13. Pearson _
S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 69.
14. Final Brief of Respondent at 10-17.
15. Pearson, _ S.C. at
, 458 S.E.2d at70; Final Brief of Appellant at 8-27. The Church
argued alternatively that the terms of Plan were unambiguous and clear. Final Brief of Appellant
at 28-45.
16. Pearson, _

S.C. at

458 S.E.2d at 69.

17. Pearson, __ S.C. at
458 S.E.2d at 69.
18. Judge Howard, author of the majority opinion, alluded to South Carolina's rich history
of jurisprudential leadership. The Judge noted that the first federal case to address the issue,
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872), relied on Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq.
(Speers Eq.) 87 (1843). The logic of Harmon is alive today.
19. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
20. Pearson,_
S.C. at _,
458 S.E.2d at 72.
21. Id. at _,
458 S.E.2d at 72.
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Serbian, which concerned a decision by the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church
to split one Diocese into three divisions and remove a bishop.' The church's
decision gave rise to a dispute between the church and the bishop over who
held title to the church's property and who controlled the Diocese. The Court
refused jurisdiction over the matter and reaffirmed the settled rule against
judicial resolution of a religious controversy except in cases of fraud or
collusion.' The Court also took the opportunity to strengthen the rule by
eliminating a previously recognized exception for "arbitrariness" in church
decisions. The Court held that "recognition of such an exception would
undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper
subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them."24
The Pearson majority opinion traced similar language throughout South
Carolina case law,'s finding that courts have been extremely reluctant to
become involved in any church dispute.26 The reluctance of state courts to
delve into church controversies evolved from the celebrated case of State ex
rel. Ottolengui v. Ancker. 27 Over the last one hundred and fifty years South
Carolina courts have embraced the following rule:
The civil courts will not enter into the consideration of church doctrine
or church discipline ....To assume such jurisdiction would not only be
an attempt by the civil courts to deal with matters of which they have no
with complete religious
special knowledge, but it would be inconsistent
28
liberty untrammeled by state authority."
Under both federal and state constitutional analysis, the Pearson majority
refused jurisdiction after finding the existence of a religious controversy.

22. Serbian, 426 U.S. at 703.
23. Id. at 713.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 18.
26. The majority cited Hatcher v. South Carolina Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, Inc.,
267 S.C. 107, 226 S.E.2d 253 (1976); Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956);
Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943); Morris St. Baptist Church v. Dart,
67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753 (1903); Wilson v. Presbyterian Church of John's Island, 19 S.C. Eq.
(2 Rich. Eq.) 192 (1846)). More recent cases like Knotts v. Williams, __ S.C. __, 462 S.E.2d
288 (1995) (holding that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dictate procedures for church
to follow in terminating its pastor) evidence the continuation of reluctance.
27. 31 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 245 (1846). In Ancker the South Carolina Supreme Court
mocked the prospect of the court settling church disputes: "If the court can be called on to settle
by its decision such disputes, it would be bound to require parties to conform to its standard of
faith-a judicial standard for theological orthodoxy!" Id. at 274.
28. Morris St. Baptist Church v. Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 342, 45 S.E. 753, 754 (1903).
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The majority further justified its deferral to the church by focusing on the
nature of the minister-church relationship. The court noted that Pearson had
subjected himself to the Church's authority by volunteering his services.2 9
This characterization followed the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in
Gonzalez v. Roman CatholicArchbishop of Manila.3"
In Gonzalez the Court held that a testamentary document could not impact
upon the Roman Catholic Church's authority in determining the qualifications
of a chaplain. 3 The Court emphasized that ecclesiastical matters, such as the
qualifications of a chaplain, were determined by church authority. Prior to any
litigation, the parties involved had agreed "by contract or otherwise" to the
church's decision.32
Similarly, in Pearsonthe court held that "Pearson voluntarily joined [the
Church] and became subject to its governance in all related matters."33 That
is, Pearson was subject to the Church's governing authority, and the court
34
could not look past the Church's definitions of the disputed terms.
Unwilling to defer so completely to the Church, Judge Connor would
have disposed of the case on the basis of contract law. Although Judge Connor
agreed that the dispute was controlled by the rule formulated in Serbian, she
felt Pearson's case could be factually distinguished from Serbian.35 Judge
Connor asserted that, under Serbian, judicial analysis of church disputes is
36
unconstitutional only if "the controversy is 'quintessentially religious.'"
Further asserting that the "core of the [Serbian]controversy concerned matters
of doctrine and faith, "31 Judge Connor decided that the dispute in Pearson
was "at its heart a civil dispute, requir[ing] the application of neutral
principles of contract law, and very little inquiry into religious law."38
It is the position of this author that the relationship between a church and
its leaders-e.g., ministers, priests, and rabbis-is fundamental to religious

29. Pearson, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 72.
30. 280 U.S. 1 (1929), cited with approvalin Pearson,_ S.C. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 71.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id.
33. Pearson, __ S.C. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 72.
34. Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 72.
35. Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 72 (Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at
458 S.E.2d at 73.
37. Id at
,458 S.E.2d at 72.
38. Id. at
458 S.E.2d at 73. Judge Connor interpreted the contract provisions in dispute
to be clear and unambiguous as a matter of law. Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 73. Scrutinizing both
the language of the Plan and the conduct of the plaintiff, Judge Connor stated that the terms of
the Plan "allowed the church to terminate Pearson's pension payments because his ministry had
been revoked." Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 73. Interestingly, Judge Connor cited no South Carolina
case law to support her position that the courts have authority to resolve such a dispute between
a church and its leadership. The Judge apparently assumed Serbian was the final word in the
matter.
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teaching and theology. Any agreement between a church and its chosen
leadership is, therefore, by its very nature an "ecclesiastical matter." The
purpose of the church-state separation doctrine is to preclude governmental
intermeddling in church doctrine and belief,39 and the ability of a court to
examine the terms of a minister's employment agreement, including all
covenants and definitions, constitutes such intermeddling. As such, the
majority's holding reaffirmed important South Carolina law. A church's ability
to administer control over its leaders, in accordance with church doctrine, is
vital to its integrity as a body of believers.
For the sake of brevity, the import of Pearsoncan be discussed within the
confines of church-related employment issues. Before going further, however,
one should note that Pearson'sapplication is for more expansive, relating to
all matters of church-state separation. With the recent rise in employmentrelated litigation,' the possibility of a greater incidence of church leaders
bringing actions against their churches and governing boards must be
acknowledged. Most disputes involving a minister or the work of a ministry
will inevitably require inquiry into church doctrine. As noted by the majority
in Pearson:
The words "license" and "ministry" are by their very nature defined in
terms of the authority which they impart to the holder. This necessarily
implicates the power to direct the ecclesiastical affairs of the Church. As
such, we have no right or authority to make value judgments concerning
41
the meaning and application of such words ....
The Pearsonmajority's reasoning should apply to all disputes between a
church and its leaders. Indeed, this has been the trend in other jurisdictions.42
Even Title VII discrimination actions have been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction under the "ecclesiastical-matter" doctrine.43

39. See Walz v. Tax. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (intent of First Amendment
prohibition of "establishment" includes the "active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity").
40. John J. Ross, The Employment-Law Year in Review, in 1 24TH ANNUAL INSTrrUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 7, 105 (Practising L. Inst. 1995) ("Employment litigation is the fastest
growing area of civil litigation in the federal system.").
41. Pearson,_
S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 72.
42. E.g., Pierce v. Iowa-Missouri Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 534 N.W.2d 425
(Iowa 1995) (refusing to review issues related to church's actions in terminating minister);
Singleton v. Christ the Servant Evangelical Lutheran Church, 541 N.W.2d 606 (Minn Ct. App.
1996) (refusing to hear pastor's claims against church based in contract); Green v. United
Pentecostal Church Int'l, 899 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. App. 1995) (dismissing action in contract and tort
against church for canceling minister's license).
43. See Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206
(N.D. Ill. 1993), aft'd, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320 (1994) (finding no
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Noting the inevitable intermeddling in religious affairs, some scholars
suggest a bright-line rule that would require court abstention from virtually all
internal church disputes. 44 Such a policy of court abstention would remove
any possibility of constitutional misstep. This author agrees: if employment
disputes between a church and its leaders, whether based on a present or past
relationship, go before the civil courts, the unavoidable result will be an
intrusion by the state into the belief structure of the church.45
The majority's reasoning in Pearson and the opinions in this note are
bolstered by the more recent decision of Knotts v. Williams.46 In Knotts the
South Carolina Supreme Court refused to resolve a church dispute over the
dismissal of a pastor.47 By unanimous decision, the court found that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to pass judgment on the procedures involved in such
a decision.4" Quoting Morris St. Baptist Church v. Dart,49 which was
decided exclusively on South Carolina law, the court implicitly reaffirmed the
court of appeals's analysis in Pearson:
When a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil
court, and not the ecclesiastical, which is to decide. But the civil tribunal
tries the civil right, and no more ....The civil courts will not enter into
the consideration of church doctrines of church discipline, nor will they
inquire into the regularity of the proceedings of the church judicatories
having cognizance of such matters. To assume such jurisdiction would not
only be an attempt by the civil courts to deal with matters of which they
have no special knowledge, but it would be inconsistent with complete
religious liberty, untrammeled by state authority. On this principle, the
action of church authorities in the deposition ofpastors and the expulsion
of members is final.50

jurisdiction when the church denied "elder" status to a female African-American).
44. Professor James L. Underwood, Strom Thurmond Professor of Law at the University of
South Carolina School of Law, proposes civil court abstention from all church disputes unless
"(1) the dispute involves third parties, such as purchasers of real property who have not
consented to a dispute resolution mechanism within the church, or (2) dispute resolution
machinery within the church has failed and a violent confrontation is likely." 3 JAMEs L.
162 (1992).
45. This idea is embodied in the historical doctrine of the Christian church: "Ecclesiaemagis
favenduw est quampersonae" (The church is to be more favored than the parson). BLACK'S LAW
UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA

DICTIONARY 512 (6th ed. 1990).
46. _
S.C. _,
462 S.E.2d 288 (1995).

47. Id. at
48. Id. at _,

,

462 S.E.2d at 288.
462 S.E.2d at 290.

49. 67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753 (1903).
50. Id. at
at 754).

, 462 S.E.2d at 290 (emphasis added) (quotingDart, 67 S.C. at 341-42,45 S.E.
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Thus, the Knotts court placed considerable weight behind the agreement,
express or implied, that existed between the church, its local leaders, and its
congregation. This analysis by the court is based on the same logical
foundation as the court of appeals's decision in Pearson:South Carolina courts
will consider disputes between churches, their pastors, or their congregations
in light of both their governing documents and their past dealings with one
another. The courts are not in a position resolve to adequately such disputes
under the law without infringing on the basic ability of the church to determine
its own set of beliefs.
Certainly, churches are not completely immune to the authority of the
federal or state judicial systems. Actions of a church or its employees that
affect the rights of those outside of a church's congregation are in many
instances subject to the judicial cognizance. 5 For example, criminal conduct
by a church or a church employee will generally be subject to the jurisdiction
of the criminal courts independent of its setting. When, however, disputes
arise from within the church body, judicial courts should carefully scrutinize
the matter before action is taken. When Judge Connor, in Pearson, advocated
that courts abstain only if a church controversy is "quintessentially religious,"
she proffered a test that pierces too deeply. Her rule would fail to adequately
prevent the potential for judicial intermeddling. The true line of demarcation
for court jurisdiction over church disputes should be much more deferential to
internal church governance. The employment context demonstrates the
principle well but is by no means the effective limit to potential harms that
would be wrought by a test such as Judge Connor's. As seen in both Pearson
and Knotts, a church's relationship with its members will invariably implicate
the church's belief system. Likewise, the bond between a church and its
leaders will almost always involve church doctrine. In internal church disputes,
nothing less than a presumption should arise against the judicial courts
exercising jurisdiction. This would force courts to carefully consider the
impact of their actions on a church's doctrine. The majority of the court of
appeals in Pearson conducted just such a careful analysis. The courts should
shy from disputes like Pearsonand Knotts which are "inherently religious" and
which "implicate church doctrine." This lesser standard of judicial involvment
would better prevent intermeddling in ecclesiastical affairs.
Martin S. Driggers, Jr.*

51. See, e.g., Neely v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 930 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(pastor's claim against church's insurer for injury on church grounds held proper); Sanders v.
Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (claim against pastor and
church for professional negligence in marital counseling is actionable).
* [Editor's Note: It is worth mention that Martin S. Driggers, Jr., currently serves as
President of the University of South Carolina Chapter of the Christian Legal Society.]
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